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Westman: Municipal Tort Liability: Notice of Claim
CASE COMMENTS
contributing to the marital dissolution, does not in itself control the
award of alimony.
The court in the instant case invoked the relatively new doctrine
of comparative rectitude. 10 Under this doctrine, a court may grant a
divorce to the party less at fault even though the misconduct of each
is a sufficient ground for divorce. This in essence makes discretionary
the application of the staid doctrine of recrimination, which allows
no divorce when both parties are guilty of misconduct.:" Recrimination is expressly commanded in the Florida divorce statute in cases
involving adultery by both parties. 2 However, recrimination was
avoided in one now famous case' 3 under this statute in which a husband was granted a divorce notwithstanding proof that he was guilty
of adultery. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that his adultery
was not a bar to the action because no adulterous act was committed
until after the ground for the divorce existed. Therefore, his subsequent misconduct could not subject him to a charge of adultery.
If the Florida Supreme Court is willing to overlook one statutory
provision to grant a divorce to an adulterous spouse, why should a
Florida district court of appeal give force to a parallel provision to
prevent a natural incident of the divorce from falling within the
scope of the court's consideration? Perhaps public policy is the answer.
But should an abandoned wife, though later guilty of the same misconduct as her spouse, be punished by nonsupport while her wayward
husband goes free?
DONALD H. REED, JR.

MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY: NOTICE OF CLAIM
Ragans v. Jacksonville, 106 So.2d 860 (1st D.C.A. Fla.1958)
Plaintiff brought an action against a municipality for injuries
allegedly inflicted in a malicious beating by a policeman. Defendant's
1017 Am. JuR., Divorce and Separation §265 (1957).
21CARSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 453.
12FLA. STAT. §65.04 (1957).
'3DeBowes v. DeBowes, 151 Fla. 308, 9 So.2d 632 (1942). The opinion was not
published in the reporter, but excerpts and commentary can be found in CARSON,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 455, n.27. See also Weyrauch, The Kinsey Reports and the
Legal Mind, 11 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 277, 283 (1958).
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motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice in the trial court. On
appeal, HELD, the city charter requires that notice of all claims sounding in tort be delivered in writing to the city attorney within thirty
days of the injury. Plaintiff's failure to comply with this provision
barred his right of action. Order affirmed.
Historically, municipalities have been held liable for torts arising
out of their proprietary activities but not for those resulting from
their governmental functions.' Florida, however, recently discarded
the distinction in Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach,2 and a city may now be
liable for the torts of its agents. But there still remains an obstacle
to recovery: the notice of claim provisions are a guillotine for the
unwary.
Most jurisdictions have statutes requiring that written notice of
a claim arising or sounding in tort be given to the city as a condition
precedent to bringing an action against itA Florida holds these notice
provisions constitutional as a necessary protection of the municipal
treasury. 4 The purpose of these provisions is to alert the appropriate
officials soon after the injury occurs, so that the city may conduct an
adequate investigation to determine its liability and thereby protect
itself against stale and fraudulent claims. 5
In states having general statutes there is a uniform time period
within which to file notice, usually from thirty to ninety days.6 In
Florida there is no general statute, and the notice provisions are included in the city charters. As a result, the time period within which
notice must be given varies from city to city.7
Normally the time period commences to run from the date of the
injury. Although the problem has never arisen in Florida, there are
situations in which the injury might not be discovered before expiration of the time for giving notice. In this situation it would be impossible for the plaintiff to comply with the provision. In an analogous case8 an injured party remained unconscious until the period in
'RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW

730 (1957).

296 So.2d 130 (1957), 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 121 (1958).
3RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 786 (1957).
4Olivier v. St. Petersburg, 65 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1953).
5lbid.
6
ALA. CODE tit. 37, §476 (1940) (6 mos.); PA. STAT. ANN.
(6 mos.); see MICH. STAT. ANN. §9.598 (1958) (60 days).

tit. 53, §5301

(1957)

7E.g., Gainesville, Fla. Spec. Acts 1927, c. 12760 (90 days); Hallandale, Fla. Spec.
Acts 1953, c. 29108 (30 days); Jacksonville, Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 11564 (30 days);
St. Petersburg, Fla. Spec. Acts 1937, c. 18896 (60 days).
SMiami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1952).
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which notice could be given had expired. The Florida Supreme
Court held that the victim should be allowed a reasonable time after
regaining consciousness in which to file the requisite written notice.
Presumably this same approach could be followed in the late discovery situation.
The effect of failing to comply with the notice provision is to bar
the injured party completely from bringing suit. 9 Failure to comply
can occur in either of two basic ways: because of insufficient written
notice or failure to give any notice. To bar the plaintiff's suit because
of omission of the time and place of injury in the written notice results in undue hardship.'0 However, the Florida Supreme Court is
strict and requires absolute compliance, as evidenced by several cases."
The Court, in taking such a narrow viewpoint, seems to ignore the
expressed purpose of the notice provisions. Protecting the municipal
treasury is admirable, but doing so at the expense of justice is quite
indefensible. Needless to say, in light of the cases involving at least
2
some written notice, failure to give any notice is a complete bar.'
In hardship cases the Florida Court has used various escape devices to achieve the desired result. Two of these are still availablewrongful death action and implied contract. It has been held that
the notice provisions are not applicable to actions for wrongful death,
since these in no manner sound in tort.' 3 It has also been held that
if the plaintiff has the option of waiving the tort and suing on the
theory of implied contract, he may choose the latter course and not
4
be subject to the notice provisions.'
9E.g., Stallings v. Tampa, 78 Fla. 606, 83 So. 625 (1919); High v. Jacksonville,
51 Fla. 207, 40 So. 1032 (1906). Note that the notice provisions apply to al
potential plaintiffs. The Florida Supreme Court in Williams v. Jacksonville, 118
Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935), held that this included employees of the municipality
as well. This seems somewhat odd because the primary and predominant relationship between the parties is that of employer-employee. This probably does not
work a hardship on city employees, however, as they are more apt to have actual
notice of such provisions than other people.
'GIt would seem not unreasonable to have the city request a bill of particulars
or at least contact the injured party or his attorney for details.
"E.g., Buck v. Hallandale, 85 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1955); Olivier v. St. Petersburg,
65 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1953); Miami Springs v. Lasseter, 60 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1952). But
see Magee v. Jacksonville, 87 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1956); Hammontree v. Tampa, 108
Fla. 343, 146 So. 556 (1933).
1sSee note 10 supra.
- Marsh v. Miami, 119 Fla. 123, 160 So. 893 (1935). But see Olivier v. St. Petersburg, 65 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1953).
24Doyle v. Coral Gables, 159 Fla. 802, 33 So.2d 41 (1947).
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A third device is estoppel. It has been employed when the city
manager had actual notice and the city's agents gave assurances that
the plaintiff's claim would be honored. 15 It is difficult to determine
from the decisions whether actual notice alone is sufficient to support
an estoppel. A 1934 decision 16 avoided the effect of failure to give
notice because the city manager was present and had actual notice.
The decision seems to have been predicated on actual notice, but
the action was for wrongful death and the Court did not discuss this
point. A 1952 decision 1 7 dismissed the plaintiff's suit in which written notice had not been given, although the plaintiff's husband had
gone to the city manager's office four days after the accident and was
informed that a full report had been given to the city attorney. The
plaintiff relied on this; the record also indicated that the city attorney
had made an investigation.
A theory of waiver by the city was used in earlier decisions,"" but
this was short-lived. It is now settled that the notice requirement
stands on the same footing as a statute of limitations, 19 which the city
20
admittedly cannot waive.
Assuming that the notice provisions are desirable from the standpoint of the public interest, several modifications are needed. First,
there should be a uniform time period for all municipalities in the
state. This could easily be effectuated by a general statute providing
for a sixty- or ninety-day period. Second, some provision should be
made for actual notice. The just solution would be to impose a burden on the plaintiff, if actual notice were alleged in lieu of written
notice, to prove that the delay had not been prejudicial to the city.
This would still provide the municipality its needed protection while
allowing the injured party to proceed with a valid claim. Allowing
the plaintiff to sue without giving written notice could not result in
stale claims because the statute of limitation is but twelve months."
Third, the date from which the time period begins to run should be
"5Tillman v. Pompano Beach, 100 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1957).
-Gainesville v. Kirkland, 116 Fla. 319, 156 So. 601 (1934).
17Aspy v. Hollywood, 60 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1952) (facts reported in Olivier v. St.
Petersburg, 65 So.2d at 73).
"8State ex rel. Miami v. Knight, 138 Fla. 374, 189 So. 425 (1939); Crumbley v.
Jacksonville, 102 Fla. 408, 135 So. 885, 138 So. 486 (1931) (waiver of defect in
notice).
19Miami Springs v. Lasseter, 60 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1952).
20Mount Dora v. Green, 117 Fla. 385, 158 So. 131 (1934).
21FA. STAT.

§95.24

(1957).
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